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I. INTRODUCTION
So long as a debtor has the financial wherewithal to pay all of
his or her obligations in full, a transfer made to a particular credi-
tor generally should not offend any principle of public policy, be-
cause such a transfer does not impair the debtor's ability to pay
others.1 However, when an insolvent debtor makes a transfer to
one of his or her creditors, questions of fairness are raised, be-
cause the effect of the preference is to deplete the already inade-
quate estate of the debtor available for satisfaction of other
claims. 2
The principle objectives of preference policy in bankruptcy are
to discourage favoritism and to promote equitable distribution of
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Nebraska College of Law. I wish to
thank my colleague, Norman W. Thorson, for his thoughtful suggestions.
1. McCoid, Bankruptcy, Preferences, and Efficiency: An Expression of Doubt, 67
VA. L REV. 249, 259-60 (1981).
2. Id. at 260.
Duncan in Nebraska Law Review (1983) 62. Copyright 1983, Nebraska Law Review. Used by permission.
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the assets of bankrupt debtors.3 Without preference law in bank-
ruptcy, creditors receiving payments or other transfers of property
of the debtor shortly before bankruptcy could obtain an unfair ad-
vantage over other, equally deserving, claimants.4 Preference law
permits the trustee to recover certain prepetition transfers from
favored creditors thereby maximizing the value of the bankruptcy
estate for the benefit of all creditors.5
In order to take into account changing commercial practices
and the widespread adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code
(U.C.C.), the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 19786 substantially re-
formed the substantive law of preferential transfers.7 Section
547(b) of the New Act provides that the trustee may avoid, as pref-
erential, any transfer8 of property of the debtor.
(1) to or for the benefit of a creditor;
(2) for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor before
such transfer was made;
(3) made while the debtor was insolvent
(4) made-
(A) on or within 90 days before the date of the filing of the peti-
tion; or
(B) between 90 days and one year before the date of the filing
of the petition, if such creditor, at the time of such transfer-
3. See Duncan, Preferential Transfers, the Floating Lien, and Section 547(c) (5)
of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 36 ARK. L. REV. 1, 11 (1982).
4. Id.
5. Id. To the extent that the trustee is able to avoid a preferential transfer of
property of the debtor, his recovery will be "for the benefit of the estate." 11
U.S.C. § 550(a) (Supp. V 1981).
6. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (codi-
fied primarily at 11 U.S.C. (Supp. V 1981) and scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.
(Supp. V 1981)) [hereinafter cited as the Bankruptcy Reform Act or the New
Act]. For the most part, the substantive provisions of the Bankruptcy Reform
Act became effective on October 1, 1979. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub.
I. No. 95-598, § 402, 92 Stat. 2682 (1978) (codified at 11 U.S.C. note preceding
§ 101 (Supp. V 1981)). The bankruptcy law replaced by the Bankruptcy Re-
form Act was the frequently amended Bankruptcy Act of 1898. Bankruptcy
Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1978) (codified in 11 U.S.C. (1976))
[hereinafter cited as the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 or the Former Act].
7. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 372 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6328 [hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORT]. For a gen-
eral discussion of the changes brought about by § 547 of the New Act, see
Kaye, Preferences Under the New Bankruptcy Code, 54 AM. BANca. L.J. 197
(1980); Macey, Preferences and Fraudulent Transfers Under the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978, 28 EMORY I.J. 685 (1979); Young, Preferences Under the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 54 Am. BAmox. UJ. 221 (1980).
8. The term "transfer" is broadly defined in § 101 of the New Act to include any
voluntary or involuntary disposition of property or an interest in property. 11
U.S.C.A. § 101(41) (West Supp. 1983). Thus, both absolute conveyances of,
and creation of security interests in, the debtor's property may result in a
preferential transfer under section 547(b). See In re Gruber Bottling Works,
Inc., 16 Bankr. 348, 351 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982).
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(i) was an insider; and
(ii) had a reasonable cause to believe the debtor was in-
solvent at the time of such transfer; and
(5) that enables such creditor to receive more than such creditor
would receive if-
(A) the case were a case under chapter 7 of this title;
(B) the transfer had not been made; and
(C) such creditor received payment of such debt to the extent
provided by the provisions of this title.9
The first element, that the transfer be made to or for the benefit
of a creditor, should normally be subject to mechanical applica-
tion.10 In the typical case, the trustee should be able to satisfy the
third requirement simply by resort to section 547(f), which creates
a rebuttable presumption that the debtor was insolvent "on and
during the 90 days immediately preceding the date of the filing of
the petition."" Moreover, since a creditor is almost always better
off with than without a prepetition transfer, the fifth element
should be met in all cases except those in which the preferred
creditor was fully secured before the transfer or the chapter 7 dis-
tribution is 100 percent to all general, unsecured claims.12
9. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (Supp. V 1981).
10. See D. EPSTEIN & J. LANDERS, DEBTORS AND CREDITORS: CASES AND MATERI-
AMs 467 (2d ed. 1982). For example, a gratuitous transfer is not a preference,
because it is not to or for the benefit of a creditor. Butz v. Wheeler (In re
Wheeler), 17 Bankr. 85 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1981).
11. 11 U.S.C. § 547(f) (Supp. V 1981). Under FED. R. EvID. 301, the effect of this
presumption is to shift to the preferred creditor the burden of going forward
with evidence to rebut the presumption. The ultimate burden of persuasion
on the issue of the debtor's insolvency remains with the trustee. In re Belize
Airways Ltd., 18 Bankr. 485 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982); In re Lucasa Int'l, Ltd., 14
Bankr. 980, 982 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y. 1981); In re National Buy-Rite Inc., 7 Bankr.
407, 409 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980); In re Butler, 3 Bankr. 182, 185 (Bankr. E.D.
Tenn. 1980); HOUSE REPORT, supra note 7, at 178-79, reprinted in 1978 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6139. See Macey, supra note 7, at 688-89. For a
case in which the transferee successfully rebutted the presumption by intro-
ducing somewhat meager documentary evidence of solvency, see In re
Thomas Farm Systems, Inc., 18 Bankr. 541 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982).
12. See D. EPSTEIN & J. LANDERS, supra note 10, at 468; R. HENSON, HANDBOOK ON
SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 12 (2d ed.
Supp. 1979); Henson, The Uniform Commercial Code and the New Bankruptcy
Act- Some Problem Areas, 35 Bus. LAw. 83, 92 (1979). For example, assume
that a creditor has a claim against the debtor of $100,000 and valid-in-bank-
ruptcy collateral of $150,000. If such creditor receives a $10,000 payment
within 90 days of bankruptcy no preference results, because the payment has
not enabled him or her to receive more than he or she would have received in
chapter 7 had the transfer not been made. With the transfer, the creditor
receives the $10,000 payment and $90,000 in chapter 7 from the collateral
without the transfer, he or she would receive $100,000 in chapter 7 from the
collateral; in either case, the creditor is paid in full and the debtor's bank-
ruptcy estate retains the debtor's equity in the collateral. See Barash v. Pub-
lic Fin. Corp., 658 F.2d 504 (7th Cir. 1981); In re Conn, 9 Bankr. 431 (Bankr.
1983]
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The second and fourth elements both involve the chronology of
the allegedly preferential transfer, and -whether or not they are sat-
isfied in any given case will generally be determined by application
of section 547(e) of the New Act, which adopts a clear and exhaus-
tive formulation of the timing of a transfer for purposes of bank-
ruptcy preference analysis.13
Once the trustee succeeds in establishing all of the elements of
a section 547(b) preference,14 it then becomes necessary to con-
sider the possible application of section 547(c), which enacts a
number of exceptions to the general rules of preference law in
bankruptcy15 Section 547(c) recognizes that certain transactions
constituting technical preferences under section 547(b) should be
protected from the reach of the trustee to the extent necessary to
effectuate overriding considerations of policy.
The principle purpose of this Article is to consider what hap-
pens under the scheme of bankruptcy preference law when a cred-
itor obtains a security interest in the debtor's personal property in
exchange for contemporaneous value and fails to promptly perfect
it against certain third parties.
N.D. Ohio 1981); In re Zuni, 6 Bankr. 449 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1980); J. WHITE & P.
SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§ 24-4, at 1004-05 (2d ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as WITrE & SUMMERS].
13. 11 U.S.C. § 547(e) (Supp. V 1981). See infra notes 17-30 and accompanying
text.
14. The trustee has the burden of alleging and proving by a fair preponderance of
the evidence all of the requisite elements of a preferential transfer. If the
trustee fails to meet his or her burden, no preference has been established
under section 547(b). See Barash v. Public Fin. Corp., 658 F.2d 504, 507 (7th
Cir. 1981); In re Saco Local Dev. Corp., 25 Bankr. 876, 878 (Bankr. D. Me. 1982);
In re Camp Rockhill, Inc., 12 Bankr. 829, 831-32 n.3 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981); In
re Burnham, 12 Bankr. 286, 297 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1981); In re Conn, 9 Bankr.
431, 434 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1981); 4 COLER ON BANKRu'rcy 1 547.55 (15th ed.
1982) [hereinafter cited as COLLIER]. Although section 547(f) of the New Act
creates a rebuttable presumption that the debtor was insolvent during the 90-
day period immediately preceding bankruptcy, the ultimate burden of per-
suasion on the issue of the debtor's insolvency remains with the trustee. See
supra note 11 and accompanying text.
15. See generally WHrrE & SUMMERS, supra note 12, §§ 24-4 to 24-5, at 1005-11; Nim-
mer, Security Interests in Bankruptcy: An Overview of Section 547 of the
Code, 17 HOUSTON L. REV. 289, 296-302 (1980). Since section 547(c) does not
create any affirmative avoidance powers in the trustee, it applies only in con-
cert with section 547(b). If the trustee fails to establish a preference under
section 547(b), judgment should be rendered for the transferee. It is only
after the trustee has met his or her burden under section 547(b) that it be-
comes necessary to determine whether section 547(c) exempts all or part of
the transfer from avoidance. See Duncan, supra note 3, at 19-20.
[Vol. 62:201
DELAYED PERFECTION
11. DELAYED PERFECTION AND PREFERENCE ATTACK
A. Section 547(e)
Few, if any, analysts would argue that a security interest given
by an insolvent debtor shortly before bankruptcy to secure a pre-
existing, previously unsecured obligation should be protected from
the trustee's preference powers. It is difficult to distinguish the
creation of such a security interest from the prototypical prefer-
ence, a payment of an antecedent indebtedness by an insolvent
debtor on the eve of bankruptcy. This type of security interest is
clearly preferential16 and should be set aside in bankruptcy with-
out regard to whether or not it is promptly filed or otherwise per-
fected under applicable state law.
Conversely, the typical extension of new credit on a secured ba-
sis does not appear to create any problems under the law of prefer-
ences-since the secured party is extending credit to the debtor
contemporaneously with the creation of its security interest in the
debtor's property, the transfer of the security interest is not being
made on account of an antecedent indebtedness and does not de-
plete the debtor's estate. However, if the secured party does not
perfect its security interest promptly, section 547(e) of the Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act may muddy the waters of the preference
analysis.
Section 547(e)1 7 permits the trustee to rewrite the history of a
16. It is a transfer to a creditor (the secured party), on account of an antecedent
debt (the preexisting obligation), made during the preference period
("shortly before bankruptcy") and while the debtor was presumed to be in-
solvent under section 547(f). Finally, since the creditor was previously un-
secured, he or she would receive more in chapter 7 with than without the
security, unless the bankruptcy estate is sufficient to pay all general, un-
secured claims in full. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (Supp. V 1981). See supra notes 9-13
and accompanying text.
17. Section 547(e) provides:
(e) (1) For the purposes of this section-(A) a transfer of real property other than fixtures, but includ-
ing the interest of a seller or purchaser under a contract for the sale
of real property, is perfected when a bona fide purchaser of such
property from the debtor against whom applicable law permits such
transfer to be perfected cannot acquire an interest that is superior to
the interest of the transferee; and
(B) a transfer of a fixture or property other than real prop-
erty is perfected when a creditor on a simple contract cannot acquire
a judicial lien that is superior to the interest of the tranferee.
(2) For the purposes of this section, except as provided in para-
graph (3) of this subsection, a transfer is made-
(A) at the time such transfer takes effect between the trans-
feror and the transferee, if such transfer is perfected at, or within 10
days after, such time;
(B) at the time such transfer is perfected, if such transfer is
perfected after such 10 days; or
1983]
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transfer of a security interest under preference attack18 by apply-
ing a combination of three distinct, chronological factors to deter-
mine the timing19 of the transfer: (1) the time at which such
transfer becomes effective between the debtor and the secured
party;20 (2) the time at which such transfer is perfected against
certain third parties;2 1 and (3) the time at which the debtor ac-
quires rights in the collateral. 22
(C) immediately before the date of the filing of the petition, if
such transfer is not perfected at the later of-
(i) the commencement of the case; and
(ii) 10 days after such transfer takes effect between the
transferor and the transferee.
(3) For the purposes of this section, a transfer is not made until
the debtor has acquired rights in the property transferred.
11 U.S.C. § 547(e) (Supp. V 1981).
18. See Hogan, Bankruptcy Reform and Delayed Filing Under the U.C.C., 35 ARx.
L. REV. 35, 44 (1981).
19. The timing of a transfer under preference attack determines whether it has
been made for or on account of an antecedent debt, while the debtor was
insolvent, and within the preference period. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (2)-(4) (Supp.
V 1981). See supra notes 9-13 and accompanying text.
20. 11 U.S.C. § 547(e) (2) (A) (Supp. V 1981). Under the Uniform Commercial
Code, a security interest becomes effective, i.e., enforceable, between the par-
ties at the time of attachment. U.C.C. § 9-203(1)-(2) (1972). In general, a se-
curity interest does not attach until all of the following have occurred. (1) the
debtor has signed an adequate security agreement (or the collateral is in the
possession of the secured party pursuant to agreement); (2) the secured
party has given "value"; and (3) the debtor has obtained "rights in the collat-
eral." Id. See generally WmrTE & SUMMERS, supra note 12, §§ 23-1 to 23-4, at
901-17; Sandford, Debtor's Rights In Collateral As a Requirement for Attach-
ment of a Security Interest Under the Uniform Commerical Code, 26 S.D.L
REv. 163 (1981).
Throughout this Article the Uniform Commercial Code shall often be re-
ferred to as the Code or U.C.C. All references in this Article to the text and
comments of the Code, unless otherwise indicated, are to the 1972 official text
of the Code.
21. 11 U.S.C. § 547(e) (2) (B) (Supp. V 1981). A transfer of an interest in personal
property is perfected for purposes of section 547 "when a creditor on a simple
contract cannot acquire a judicial lien that is superior to the interest of the
transferee." 11 U.S.C. § 547(e) (1) (B) (Supp. V 1981). This test is identical in
all material respects with the concept of perfection under article 9 of the
Code. See U.C.C. §§ 9-201, 9-301(1) (b) (1972). The steps required for perfec-
tion are enumerated in sections 9-302, 9-304,9-305 and 9-306 of the Code. Some
security interests, such as purchase money security interests in consumer
goods, are perfected automatically at the time of attachment without any ad-
ditional requirements. U.C.C. § 9-302(1) (d) (1972). However, generally a se-
cured party perfects an article 9 security interest either by filing a financing
statement in the proper public office or offices or by taking possession of the
collateral. U.C.C. §§ 9-302, 9-304 to 9-305. See generally WirrE & SUMMERS,
supra note 12, §§ 23-5 to 23-16, at 918-64.
22. 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(3) (Supp. V 1981). The principle significance of section
547(e) (3) is with respect to security interests attaching to after-acquired col-
lateral during the preference period. See Duncan, supra note 3, at 17-18.
[Vol. 62:201
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Under section 547(e)(2) (A), a transfer of a security interest in
personal property will be deemed made, for purposes of bank-
ruptcy preference law, at the time it attaches under section 9-203 of
the U.C.C., provided it is perfected not later than ten days after
attachment.2 In effect, section 547(e) (2) (A) gives the secured
party a ten-day grace period following attachment to perfect its se-
curity interest. However, if the secured party perfects outside the
grace period, the transfer will be deemed made at the time of
perfection under section 547(e) (2) (B).24 Finally, if the secured
party fails to perfect before the later of the expiration of the grace
period and the commencement of the bankruptcy case, the trans-
fer will be deemed to have been made "immediately before the
date of the filing of the petition."25
The operation of section 547(e) is best explained by illustration.
23. 11 U.S.C. § 547(e) (2) (A) (Supp. V 1981). Although at first glance this provi-
sion appears similar to U.C.C. § 9-301(2), closer inspection reveals significant
differences. Thus, the 10-day grace period under the Code is limited to
purchase money security interests, while section 547(e) (2) (A) applies
broadly to all transfers. Additionally, the 10-day period under the Code be-
gins to run when the debtor "receives possession of the collateral," while
under the Bankruptcy Reform Act the grace period starts "at the time [the]
transfer takes effect between the transferor and the transferee." Compare
U.C.C. § 9-301(2) (1972) with 11 U.S.C. § 547(e) (2) (A) (Supp. V 1981). See
also U.C.C. § 9-312(3)-(4) (1972). In a recent article, Professor Hogan criti-
cized this failure of the New Act to conform to the Code:
If delivery is delayed the bankruptcy 10 days may well expire before
the UCC period begins. This difference makes no sense. If creditors
are misled at all by the delay it is unlikely that they would be misled
from the time the transfer takes effect between the parties when the
debtor-buyer may not be in possession of the goods. Further the
careful secured party may simply contract to make the transfer take
effect at the time of delivery and thus get the full 10 days recognized
in bankruptcy. The Bankruptcy Reform Act should simply measure
the ten day period in purchase money cases from the time of delivery
of the goods.
Hogan, supra note 18, at 46. See also 11 U.S.C. § 547(c) (3) (B) (Supp. V 1981);
Breitowitz, Article 9 Security Interests As Avoidable Preferences, 3 CARDozo
L REV. 357, 395-99 (1982). One possible response to Professor Hogan's con-
cern is to argue that a purchase money secured party who perfects after expi-
ration of the 10-day bankruptcy grace period but within an applicable state
grace period is protected in bankruptcy under section 547(e) (1) (B), because
its security interest was never vulnerable to a lien creditor and therefore
"was perfected from the time it attached, both under state law and under the
definition of perfection in the preference statute." In re Burnette, 14 Bankr.
795, 802 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1981). But see In re Murray, 27 Bankr. 445, 447-48
(Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1983).
24. 11 U.S.C. § 547(e) (2) (B) (Supp. V 1981).
25. 11 U.S.C. § 547(e) (2) (C) (Supp. V 1981). This section insures that the trans-
fer will be treated as a prepetition transfer for purposes of section 547(b) (4)
of the New Act. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (4) (Supp. V 1981) (to be preferential, a
transfer must be made on, or within certain periods of time before, the filing
of the bankruptcy petition).
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Suppose, for example, that on January 1, 1982, secured party (SP)
makes a loan to debtor (D) and obtains an adequate security
agreement creating a security interest in certain items of D's busi-
ness equipment. On January 5, 1982, SP duly files a financing
statement to perfect its security interest in the equipment, and on
April 4, 1982, D files a bankruptcy petition. Under section
547(e) (2) (A), the security interest is deemed to have been trans-
ferred on January 1, 1982, because SP perfected within ten days
after the security interest attached to the equipment and became
enforceable between D and SP.26
Suppose further that instead of filing on January 5, 1982, SP
waits until January 15, 1982 to perfect its security interest. Now
section 547(e) (2) (B) applies, and the transfer is deemed to have
been made on January 15, 1982, the time of perfection, for purposes
of preference analysis.27
Finally, suppose that SP neither files a financing statement nor
otherwise perfects its security interest before commencement of
the bankruptcy case on April 4, 1982. These added facts trigger sec-
tion 547(e) (2) (C), and the transfer is deemed to have been made
"immediately before" the filing of the April 4 bankruptcy petition,
because the security interest was not perfected at the time of
bankruptcy and the ten-day grace period had already expired.28
Obviously, section 547(e) can have a critical impact on a trans-
fer under preference attack. Under the provision, timely perfected
security interests will be tested for preferential effect as of the date
of the creation of the security interest; however, security interests
perfected outside the ten-day grace period will suffer the test as of
the date of perfection.
For example, consider the probable effect of section 547(e) on
the three hypotheticals posed immediately above. The first trans-
fer, which was perfected within the ten-day grace period on Janu-
ary 5, 1982, is not a section 547(b) preference. Since it is deemed to
have been made on January 1, 1982, when the loan was made and
the security interest was created, both the antecedent debt and
ninety-day preference period requirements are lacking.2 9 How-
ever, the latter two transfers are probably section 547(b) prefer-
ences, because they are deemed to have been made, respectively,
on January 15, 1982, and April 4, 1982, and therefore are treated as
26. 11 U.S.C. § 547(e) (2) (A) (Supp. V 1981). See In re Church Buildings And In-
teriors, Inc., 14 Bankr. 128 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1981).
27. 11 U.S.C. § 547(e) (2) (B) (Supp. V 1981). See In re HaIl, 14 Bankr. 186 (Bankr.
S.D. Fla. 1981); Matter of Brimhall, 13 Bankr. 942 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1981);In re
Kelley, 3 Bankr. 651 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1980).
28. 11 U.S.C. § 547(e) (2) (C) (Supp. V 1981).
29. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (2), (b) (4), (e) (2) (A) (Supp. V 1981).
[Vol. 62:201
DELAYED PERFECTION
having been given within ninety days of bankruptcy on account of
the January 1, 1982 antecedent indebtedness. 30
B. Section 547(c)(1) and Substantially Contemporaneous Perfection
L The Developing Case Law
Under the law of preferences, security interests given in ex-
change for contemporaneous value and perfected more than ten
days after their creation are schizophrenic. Factually, they are not
preferential, because they have been transferred for new value
and, therefore, not on account of an antecedent debt. However,
under the legal fiction authored by section 547(e) of the Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act, their timing is postponed until the date of
perfection, and, when bankruptcy ensues within ninety days there-
after, they take on the character of section 547(b) preferences.
The developing case law in bankruptcy reflects the tension that
is created by this friction between the factual and fictional per-
sonae of these security interests. The focal point of this contro-
versy in the cases is a provision of the Bankruptcy Reform Act that
almost certainly was not designed to apply to the problem of
delayed perfection, section 547(c) (1).31
Section 547(c) (1) provides an exception from preference attack
30. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (2), (b) (4), (e) (2) (B), (e) (2) (C) (Supp. V 1981). All of the
other elements of a section 547(b) preference appear to have been met. See
11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1), (b) (3), (b) (5), (f) (Supp. V 1981). See also In re Hall, 14
Bankr. 186 (Bankr. SD. Fla. 1981); Matter of Brimhall, 13 Bankr. 942 (Bankr.
D. Idaho 1981); In re Kelley, 3 Bankr. 651 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1980). This anal-
ysis discounts the potential application of the exceptions to the trustee's
preference avoiding powers created by section 547(c). 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)
(Supp. V 1981).
Moreover, the transfer described in the third hypothetical is also avoida-
ble under section 544(a) of the New Act, the so-called "strong-arm clause,"
which confers upon the trustee the rights and powers of a judicial lien credi-
tor "as of the commencement of the case." 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) (1) (Supp. V
1981). Under U.C.C. §9-301(1)(b), an unperfected security interest is
subordinate to the rights of "a person who becomes a lien creditor before the
security interest is perfected." U.C.C. § 9-301(1) (b) (1972). See also U.C.C.
§ 9-301(2) (1972); 11 U.S.C. § 546(b) (Supp. V 1981). Thus, since in the third
hypothetical SP's security interest was unperfected at the time of bank-
ruptcy, it is subordinate to the trustee's rights as a hypothetical lien creditor.
Conversely, the security interests described in the first two hypotheticals are
not subject to avoidance under section 544(a), because they were perfected
prior to bankruptcy, and, therefore, prior to the existence of the trustee's lien
creditor status. See Hogan, supra note 18, at 41-42.
31. Section 547(c) (1) provides:
(c) The trustee may not avoid under this section a transfer-
(1) to the extent that such transfer was-
(A) intended by the debtor and the creditor to or for
whose benefit such transfer was made to be a contemporane-
ous exchange for new value given to the debtor and
1983]
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for an otherwise preferential transfer to the extent that such trans-
fer was: (1) intended by the parties to be a contemporaneous ex-
change for new value,3 2 and (2) in fact a "substantially
contemporaneous exchange." 33 The sparse legislative history of
this provision indicates that it has a rather limited purpose-pro-
tection of persons who transfer contemporaneous value to the
debtor in exchange for the debtor's personal check.3 4 However,
when section 547(c) (1) is read together with the definitions of the
terms "transfer"35 and "new value,"36 it is obvious that the sub-
stantially contemporaneous exchange exception has a much
longer reach than that suggested by its inconclusive legislative
history.3 7
For example, section 547(c) (1) appears to codify the holdings of
two leading cases decided under the Former Act, Dean v. Davis3 8
and National City Bank v. Hotchkiss.39 In the Dean case, the
Supreme Court held that the transfer of a mortgage deed of trust
covering most of the debtor's property was not a preference even
though it was not executed and recorded until more than a week
after the loan secured thereby had been made. Since the parties
had from the outset intended a secured transaction, and the trans-
fer of the mortgage was "substantially contemporary" with the
making of the loan, the Court concluded that the transfer had not
(B) in fact a substantially contemporaneous exchange.
11 U.S.C. § 547(c) (1) (Supp. V 1981).
32. The term "new value" is defined in section 547(a) (2):
(2) "new value" means money or money's worth in goods, serv-
ices, or new credit, or release by a transferee of property previously
transferred to such transferee in a transaction that is neither void
nor voidable by the debtor or the trustee under any applicable law,
but does not include an obligation substituted for an existing
obligation.
11 U.S.C. § 547(a) (2) (Supp. V 1981).
33. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c) (1) (Supp. V 1981).
34. See HousE REPORT, supra note 7, at 373, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 5963, 6329. This protection is probably unnecessary, because con-
temporaneous payment by check is not a true credit transaction and there-
fore should not be treated as a transfer on account of an antecedent debt for
purposes of section 547(b) (2). See 124 CONG. REc. 34,000 (1978); 124 CONG.
REc. 32,400 (1978); P. MuRPHY, CREDrrORS' RiGHTS IN BANKRUPry § 10.08, al
10-8 (1980).
35. 11 U.S.CA. § 101(41) (West Supp. 1983) defines the term "transfer" ver3
broadly and expressly includes transfers in the form of security interests
See supra note 8.
36. 11 U.S.C. § 547(a) (2) (Supp. V 1981) (emphasis added) defines the term "nei
value" as including not only "money or money's worth in goods, services, c
new credit," but also "release by a transferee of property previously trar
ferred to such transferee." See supra note 32.
37. In re Burnette, 14 Bankr. 795, 802 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1981).
38. 242 U.S. 438 (1917).
39. 231 U.S. 50 (1913).
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been made on account of an antecedent debt.40 Conversely, in
Hotchkiss the Court held that a preference resulted when a lender
made an unsecured loan to the debtor in the morning and, after
learning of the debtor's financial difficulties, demanded and re-
ceived a transfer of security later the same day. Since the parties
did not originally intend the loan to be secured, the subsequent
transfer of security was on account of an antecedent indebtedness
and therefore preferential. 4 1
As in Dean and Hotchkiss, the key inquiry under section
547(c) (1) is whether the parties at the outset intended a contempo-
raneous exchange. 42 If it is determined that a contemporaneous
exchange was intended, the transferee will be protected against
the trustee's preference attack, provided the exchange was com-
pleted within a reasonable period of time.43 Thus, a potentially
large number of transactions could be protected by section
547(c) (1). For example, in addition to mortgages and security in-
terests created within a reasonable period of time following dis-
bursement of the proceeds of an intended secured loan,44
40. 242 U.S. at 442-43.
41. 231 U.S. at 55-58.
42. See In re Saco Local Dev. Corp., 25 Bankr. 876, 879 (Bankr. D. Me. 1982); In re
Fabric Buys of Jericho, Inc., 22 Bankr. 1013, 1016 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982); In re
Hersman, 20 Bankr. 569, 572-73 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1982). Although interesting
questions of proof of the intent element may arise in certain situations, see,
e.g.,In re T.L Swartz Clothiers, Inc., 15 Bankr. 590 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1981), the
intent of the parties to exchange contemporaneous value should be easy to
prove in the typical delayed perfection case. There, the secured party will
usually have documentation, delivered at the closing of the loan, such as a
note, a loan agreement, and a security agreement, evidencing the parties' in-
tent to enter into a secured transaction.
43. The Bankruptcy Reform Act contains no guidance as to the meaning of "sub-
stantially contemporaneous exchange." The better-reasoned bankruptcy
cases apply a case-by-case approach and consider all of the factors bearing on
the commercial reasonableness of the delay. Compare In re Arnett, 13 Bankr.
267, 269 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1981), aff'd, 17 Bankr. 912 (E.D. Tenn. 1982) (delay
of 33 days held substantially contemporaneous where, after considering all of
the surrounding facts, the court concluded that the transferee had "satisfac-
torily explained the delay"), with Matter of Christian, 8 Bankr. 816, 818
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1981) (delay of 14 days held not substantially contempora-
neous because secured party applied for a certificate of title and lien recorda-
tion in the usual manner and did not take advantage of "an expedited service
for an extra charge"). See infra note 87 and accompanying text.
44. See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text. Delayed creation of security
interests should be distinguished from delayed perfection thereof. A security
interest which is created subsequent to disbursement of the proceeds of the
loan being secured thereby will always be treated as a transfer on account of
an antecedent debt under the timing rules of section 547(e), because the ear-
liest possible date for the transfer is the date of creation, i.e., the date the
transfer takes effect between the parties. 11 U.S.C. § 547(e) (2) (A), (e) (2) (B)
(Supp. V 1981). For example, suppose SP loans D $100,000 on January 1, 1982,
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substantially contemporaneous substitutions of collateral 45 and
slightly delayed cash payments for goods and services4 6 are proba-
bly covered by the exception.
However, the cases are almost evenly split on the question of
application of section 547(c) (1) to security interests that are not
perfected within the ten-day grace period established by section
547(e). One group of cases adopts a narrow view of the substan-
tially contemporaneous exchange exception and simply refuses to
apply it to security interests that are not timely perfected.47 The
opinion of the bankruptcy court in Matter of Vance 48 is typical of
the reasoning adopted by these cases. In Vance, the secured party,
Valley Bank, apparently made a purchase money loan to the
debtor on November 18, 1981 to enable him to acquire a utility
trailer. At the same time, a security agreement covering the trailer
was entered into between the parties. However, it was not until
fourteen days later, on December 2, 1981, that the bank's security
interest was perfected by recordation on the certificate of title coy-
and that, although the parties have from the outset intended a secured trans-
action, a formal security agreement covering D's business equipment is not
entered into until January 3, 1982. SP then immediately perfects. Under sec-
tion 547(e) (2) (A), the security interest in the equipment is dated as of Janu-
ary 3, 1982, because it did not attach and become effective between the parties
under the U.C.C. until D had signed an adequate security agreement. See 11
U.S.C. § 547(e) (2) (A) (Supp. V 1981); U.C.C. § 9-203(1) (a) (1972). Thus, this
transfer is treated as having been made on account of an antecedent debt
(the January 1, 1982 loan) under section 547(b)(2). 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(2)
(Supp. V 1981). However, section 547(c) (1) should protect this transfer from
the trustee, because the parties intended a contemporaneous exchange for
new value and the transfer of the security interest was in fact substantially
contemporaneous. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c) (1) (Supp. V 1981). See supra notes 38-
41 and accompanying text.
45. Thus, for example, a creditor with a security interest in an item of business
equipment who agrees to release his lien provided that the debtor obtains
replacement collateral should be protected, so long as the switch is com-
pleted within a reasonable period of time. 11 U.S.C. §547(a)(2), (c)(1)
(Supp. V. 1981). See 2 NORTON, BANKRUPTCY LAw AND PRACTICE § 32.13, at 39-
41 (1981); P. MuRPI-Y, supra note 34, § 10.14, at 10-14.
46. See In re Fabric Buys of Jericho, Inc., 22 Bankr. 1013 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982);
Kaye, Preferences Under the New Bankruptcy Code, 54 Am. BAN'. U.J. 197,
199 (1980). "A great number of routine transactions have small, immaterial
gaps if transactions are analyzed on a fine enough time scale. Even payment
at a gasoline station is for an antecedent debt." Morris, Bankruptcy Law Re-
form.: Preferences, Secret Liens and Floating Liens, 54 MINN. L. REv. 737, 762
(1970).
47. See, e.g., In re Murray, 27 Bankr. 445 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1983); In re Davis, 22
Bankr. 644 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1982); Matter of Vance, 22 Bankr. 26 (Bankr. D.
Idaho 1982); In re Enlow, 20 Bankr. 480 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1982); Matter of
Christian, 8 Bankr. 816 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1981). See also 4 CoLumR, supra
note 14, 547.46[3], at 547-136.4 n.13c.
48. 22 Bankr. 26 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1982).
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ering the trailer. Bankruptcy ensued on January 29, 1982, and,
when the bank sought relief from the automatic stay in order to
foreclose its security interest in the trailer, the trustee counter-
claimed seeking to set aside the lien as a preference under section
547(b).
The court began its analysis by citing section 547(e) (2) (B) and
noting that, since the security interest had not been perfected dur-
ing the ten-day grace period following its creation, the transfer of
the security interest in the trailer occurred on December 2, 1981,
the date of perfection, and, therefore, was made on account of the
antecedent loan of November 18, 1981.49 Since the other elements
of section 547(b) were satisfied, a preference had been
established.50
Next, the court held that the bank's purchase money security
interest was not protected by section 547(c) (3), the so-called en-
abling loan exception, because it was not perfected within ten days
after attachment as required by that provision.5 1
Finally, the court considered the bank's argument that the se-
curity interest in the trailer "is exempt from avoidance under
§ 547(c) (1) because it was intended as a contemporaneous ex-
change for new value and was in fact a substantially contempora-
neous exchange."5 2 Bankruptcy Judge Young held that section
547(c) (1) does not apply to security interests perfected outside the
bankruptcy grace period and explained his reasoning as follows:
To ignore the date of actual perfection of security interests would be to
negate the operation of subsection (e) establishing when a tranfer occurs
for purposes of § 547 as well as to make superfluous the grace periods of
§ 547(c) (3) and § 547(e) (2) (A). Moreover, such a stance invites litigation
over the question when in fact a transfer is "substantially contemporane-
49. Id. at 27.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 28. Section 547(c) (3) provides:
(c) The trustee may not avoid under this section a transfer-
(3) of a security interest in property acquired by the debtor-
(A) to the extent such security interest secures new value
that was-
(i) given at or after the signing of a security agreement that
contains a description of such property as collateral;
(ii) given by or on behalf of the secured party under such
agreement;
(iii) given to enable the debtor to acquire such property;
and
(iv) in fact used by the debtor to acquire such property;
and
(B) that is perfected before 10 days after such security inter-
est attaches.
11 U.S.C. § 547(c) (3) (Supp. V 1981).
52. 22 Bankr. at 28.
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ous." There are no objective standards for determining this fact and the
courts are having great difficulty in determining the issue, creating much
uncertainty in the law.
5 3
A second group of cases rejects the reasoning of Vance and ap-
plies the substantially contemporaneous exchange exception to
belatedly perfected security interests that otherwise qualify for its
protection.5 4 For example, in In re Arnett, 55 the debtors obtained a
loan from Security Mutual Finance Corporation and granted it a
security interest in an automobile on December 10, 1980. However,
due to circumstances beyond its control, the finance corporation
was unable to perfect its security interest in the automobile until
January 12, 1981, thirty-three days later. The delay was caused by
the holder of a prior security interest in the automobile who, after
being paid off by Security Mutual, waited nearly a month before
releasing its lien and returning the certificate of title covering the
vehicle.5 6
The court held that the transfer was protected by section
547(c) (1), because Security Mutual and the debtors intended a
contemporaneous exchange for new value and, in light of the sur-
rounding facts and circumstances, the exchange was "in fact" sub-
53. Id. Another reason sometimes articulated by courts for not applying the sub-
stantially contemporaneous exchange exception to belatedly perfected secur-
ity interests is the following statement concerning section 547(c) (1)
contained in the House Report of the Judiciary Committee accompanying the
bill which became the Bankruptcy Reform Act:
The first exception is for a transfer that was intended by all par-
ties to be a conemporaneous exchange for new value, and was in fact
substantially contemporaneous. Normally, a check is a credit trans-
action. However, for the purposes of this paragraph, a transfer in-
volving a check is considered to be "intended to be
contemporaneous," and if the check is presented for payment in the
normal course of affairs, which the Uniform Commercial Code speci-
fies as 30 days, U.C.C. § 3-503(2) (a), that will amount to a transfer
that is "in fact substantially contemporaneous."
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 7, at 373, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 5963, 6329. These courts narrowly interpret this legislative history and
conclude that Congress intended section 547(c) (1) to apply only to cash or
quasi-cash transactions. See In re Murray, 27 Bankr. 445, 450-51 (Bankr. M.D.
Tenn. 1983); In re Davis, 22 Bankr. 644, 648-49 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1982); In re
Enlow, 20 Bankr. 480, 483 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1982); Matter of Christian, 8 Bankr.
816, 819 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1981).
54. See, e.g., In re Martella, 22 Bankr. 649 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1982); In re Burnette,
14 Bankr. 795 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1981); In re Hall, 14 Bankr. 186 (Bankr. S.D.
Fla. 1981);In re Arnett, 13 Bankr. 267 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1981), affld, 17 Bankr.
912 (E.D. Tenn. 1982).
55. 13 Bankr. 267 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1981), affld, 17 Bankr. 912 (E.D. Tenn. 1982).
56. 13 Bankr. at 268. Security Mutual perfected its security interest immediately
upon receiving the certificate of title from the prior lienholder, the American
National Bank and Trust Company. Id. at 269.
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stantially contemporaneous. 5 7 Since Security Mutual had
"satisfactorily explained the delay" and there was "no risk of fraud
or misrepresentation," the court concluded that "equity demands
that Security Mutual prevail against the trustee."5 8
2. A Proposed Solution
The task of resolving the controversy that has developed in the
case law interpreting section 547(c) (1) in the context of belatedly
perfected security interests is a demanding one, because both
sides offer reasonable interpretations of the statutory design.
Moreover, difficult questions of policy concerning the relationship
in bankruptcy between secured and unsecured creditors are in-
volved. However, after reconsidering my views on several occa-
sions, I have concluded that the better-reasoned cases are those
that adopt a more flexible solution to the problem and apply sec-
tion 547(c) (1) broadly to security interests, whenever perfected,
that meet its requirements.
Bankruptcy preference law is one of the major battlegrounds in
the war between secured and unsecured creditors. One of the pri-
mary goals of bankruptcy law is to minimize the social costs of
bankruptcy by spreading the risk of the debtor's financial collapse
among all of his or her creditors.5 9 To the extent that security in-
terests are recognized and enforced in bankruptcy, these costs are
borne disproportionately by unsecured creditors.60 However,
bankruptcy law is not intended to interfere with the legitimate
contractual expectations of creditors who bargain for security
against the risk of the borrower's insolvency. Bankruptcy is the
litmus test of security, and to deny protection to secured creditors
in bankruptcy would have a potentially disasterous effect on the
cost and availability of both consumer and commercial credit.61
57. 13 Bankr. at 269. The court summarized the facts and circumstances support-
ing its ruling.
There was absolutely no delay on Security Mutual's behalf. It
took prompt action by calling the bank several times. It filed to per-
fect its security interest on the day it received the title certificate. It
was impossible to file any sooner. Any delay was caused by the
United States Postal Service and the bank. It was the Christmas sea-
son. Mail was slow. The bank had a number of employees off for the
holidays or sickness.
Id.
58. Id.
59. See Jackson & Kronman, Voidable Preferences and Protection of the Expecta-
tion Interest, 60 MNm. L REV. 971, 989 (1976).
60. See id.
61. If a trustee in bankruptcy were permitted to use his avoiding powers
to nullify, without restriction, the priorities for which the bankrupt's
secured creditors have bargained, the use of secured transactions as
a financing device would be significantly chilled-perhaps frostbit-
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Bankruptcy preference law, and in particular grey areas such as
section 547(c) (1), should be construed purposively and with due
regard being given to the interests of both secured and unsecured
creditors.
Under what circumstances are the purposes of preference law
undercut by recognition of security interests in bankruptcy? Let's
look at three cases.
Case 1
First, consider the classic example of preferential security, a se-
curity interest given during the preference period to secure a pre-
existing, unsecured obligation. This transfer offends preference
policy because it is the equivalent of a cash payment made on the
eve of bankruptcy to a general creditor-assets of the debtor that
ought to be included in the bankruptcy distribution to all creditors
have been encumbered for the benefit of a favored creditor who
had no legitimate expectation of preferential treatment.62
Case 2
In contrast, when a creditor extends new credit on a secured
basis to the debtor and immediately perfects its lien, no preference
results; 63 although the debtor's assets are being tied up for the
benefit of a particular creditor, the secured party legitimately ex-
pects, and receives, protection in bankruptcy for two reasons:
(1) it never intended to extend unsecured credit to the debtor-the
security was negotiated in connection with the making of the loan
and was an integral factor in the secured lender's calculation of the
risk and cost of the credit; and (2) the transaction did not deplete
the debtor's estate available for distribution to other creditors, be-
cause the debtor received equivalent value, i.e., the proceeds of the
loan, contemporaneously with the transfer of the security.
Case 3
Now consider the problem of delayed perfection of a security
interest given by the debtor to secure a contemporaneous exten-
sion of credit. Is this scenario more like Case 1 or Case 2 above?
ten. Like contracts of other sorts, secured contracts embody a set of
expectations that cannot be ignored without frustrating the very pur-
pose such transactions are designed to serve. Obviously this result
would be undesirable from the standpoint of secured creditors; but
more importantly, it would also harm debtors by significantly re-
stricting the availability of credit.
Id. at 988-89.
62. See supra notes 2 & 16 and accompanying text.
63. See supra notes 17-30 and accompanying text.
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Clearly, the answer is the latter-there is no difference in eco-
nomic effect between Case 2 and Case 3, because in each case con-
temporaneous exchanges of equivalent value have been made.
Yet, it is just as clear that section 547(e) treats Case 3 as a transfer
on account of an antecedent debt, if the security interest is not per-
fected within the ten-day grace period following attachment. 64
What is being accomplished by this employment of section 547(e),
and how does section 547(c) (1) figure in the design?
The ten-day rule for perfection of security interests established
by section 547(e) is an attempt by Congress to employ preference
law to avoid a class of transfers, so-called "secret liens," that are
not true preferences. 65 Bankruptcy condemns true preferences
because of their economic consequences-the goal of preference
law is to prevent a general, unsecured creditor from improving its
position, at the expense of other, similarly situated creditors, by a
64. Id. Belatedly perfected security interests were less susceptible to preference
attack under the Former Act, because in order to set aside a preference the
trustee was required to establish that the transferee had reasonable cause to
believe that the debtor was insolvent at the time of the transfer. Bankruptcy
Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 60b, 30 Stat. 562 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 96b (1976)), re-
pealed by, Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L No. 95-598, title IV,
§ 401(a), 92 Stat. 2682. See generally 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTcy 60.52 to
60.56 (14th ed. 1977). Proof of the "reasonable cause" requirement was all too
frequently an insurmountable hurdle for the trustee under the Former Act.
See HousE REPORT, srupra note 7, at 178, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 5963, 6138-39. As a result of this failure of proof, many transfers that
were actually preferential in all other respects escaped invalidation in bank-
ruptcy. Consequently, one of the most fundamental policies of the Former
Act, equality of distribution among similarly situated creditors, was compro-
mised severely. Id.; 3 COLLER, supra, § 60.52, at 1056. Section 547(b) of the
Bankruptcy Reform Act eliminates the reasonable cause to believe require-
ment in the case of the typical, ninety-day preference. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)
(Supp. V 1981). The test is retained only with respect to preferential trans-
fers made to insiders "between 90 days and one year before the date of the
filing of the petition." 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (4) (B) (Supp. V 1981). Thus, fairness
to other creditors of the debtor, as demonstrated by the economic impact of
the transfer on the debtor's bankruptcy estate, and not the subjective guilt or
innocence of the preferred transferee, is the basic test of a preferential trans-
fer under the Bankruptcy Reform Act. See HousE REPORT, mupra note 7, at
178, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6138-39. However, the
United States Senate has recently passed legislation containing language
reinserting the reasonable cause to believe test as an essential element of all
avoidable preferences. S. 1013, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 511 (1983); S. 445, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 211 (1983). See also H.R. 1800, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., § 111
(1983). If enacted into law, this misguided legislation would cripple the pol-
icy of equitable distribution and might well render obsolete many of the pro-
visions of section 547. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 547(c),(f) (Supp. V 1981).
65. "The purpose [of section 547(e) (2) (B) ] is to protect other creditors who may
rely on the public record by punishing the negligent creditor who fails to rec-
ord his security interest within ten days." In re Hall, 14 Bankr. 186, 187
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1981).
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bankruptcy-eve transfer of property of the debtor.66 However, un-
perfected transfers of security are condemned because of the dan-
ger that other creditors dealing with the debtor will be misled by
the unencumbered facade of the debtor's assets. 67 The existence
of an antecedent debt, which is at the vortex of preference policy,
is, therefore, completely irrelevant to the Bankruptcy Reform Act's
hostility toward secret liens. Since the primary function of section
547(e) is to date transfers for purposes of the antecedent debt re-
quirement, it is an inappropriate tool for dealing with the secret
lien problem in bankruptcy.68 Moreover, it is clear that in at least
some cases belatedly perfected security interests that offend
neither preference nor secret lien policy are treated as preferential
under sections 547(b) and 547(e) (2) (B). It is the thesis of this Ar-
ticle that purposive construction of section 547(c) (1) may aid in
the resolution of this breakdown in bankruptcy policy.
As discussed above, the case law has produced competing inter-
pretations of the relationship between section 547(c) (1) and the
delayed perfection problem. Each of those views is the result of a
reasonable attempt to construe a hopelessly ambiguous enact-
ment. However, only one of those views, that broadly applying the
substantially contemporaneous exchange exception to belatedly
perfected security interests, is true to both the spirit, as well as the
letter, of the relevant provisions of the Bankruptcy Reform Act.
The cases refusing to apply the substantially contemporaneous
exchange exception to the delayed perfection problem support
their holdings with debatable conclusions concerning the intent of
Congress. They take the position that the legislative history of sec-
tion 547(c) (1)69 and the enactment of ten-day grace periods for
66. See Nimmer, supra note 15, at 293-94. An exchange of concurrent value be-
tween debtor and creditor, such as a transfer of collateral to secure a loan
being made at the same time, does not offend this policy, because the secured
party has not improved its preexisting position at the expense of other credi-
tors. Id. at 294.
67. See In re Phillips, 24 Bankr. 712, 715 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1982); Morris, supra
note 46, at 758.
68. See id. at 737, 757-59. Using preference law as a device for invalidation of se-
cret liens presents problems both of overkill and underkill. Thus, overkill oc-
curs when rigid application of the 10-day rule allows the trustee to employ his
or her preference powers to avoid security interests that offend neither pref-
erence nor secret lien policy. Underkill can result when one or more of the
elements of a preference is absent in a case involving a secret lien. Suppose,
for example, that a security interest is created on January 1, 1981, perfected
on January 1, 1982, and bankruptcy is filed on April 15, 1982. Although this
security interest remained a secret lien for a period of one year, it is not
avoidable under section 547(b) unless the transferee is an insider, because
the transfer did not occur during the 90-day, prepetition preference period. 11
U.S.C. § 547(b) (4) (A), (e) (1) (B), (e) (2) (B) (Supp. V 1981).
69. See upra note 53.
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perfection of security interests in sections 547(e) and 547(c)(3)
demonstrate that Congress intended the substantially contempo-
raneous exchange exception to protect only cash or quasi-cash
transactions.70 This reasoning, although not unreasonable, is ulti-
mately unpersuasive.
As discussed above, the legislative history of section 547(c) (1)
is sparse and inconclusive; at most, it suggests that Congress did
not have a clear understanding of the potential significance of the
substantially contemporaneous exchange exception.7 1 Moreover,
the argument that applying section 547(c) (1) to the delayed
perfection problem would "make superfluous the grace periods of
§ 547(c) (3) and § 547(e) (2) (A)" also misses the mark. Since by
definition section 547(c) applies only after the trustee has estab-
lished a section 547(b) preference,7 2 application of section
547(c) (1) will always be in connection with a transfer that has al-
ready been determined to have been made on account of an ante-
cedent debt under the timing rules of section 547(e).73 Section
547(c) (1) is intended to be inconsistent with section 547(e); its
proper role is to protect recipients of substantially contemporane-
ous exchanges against the sometimes arbitrary lines drawn by the
artificial timing rules of section 547(e).
Neither is there a fatal inconsistency between sections
547(c) (1) and 547(c) (3).74 Obviously, there is a substantial overlap
70. See In re Murray, 27 Bankr. 445 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1983); In re Davis, 22
Bankr. 644 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1982); Matter of Vance, 22 Bankr. 26 (Bankr. D.
Idaho 1982); In re Enlow, 20 Bankr. 480 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1982); Matter of
Christian, 8 Bankr. 816 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1981). See supra note 53 and accom-
panying text.
71. See supra notes 34-37 & 53 and accompanying text
72. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
73. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (2), (c) (1), (e) (Supp. V 1981). In fact, the sole function of
section 547(c) (1) is to protect intended contemporaneous exchanges that, for
one reason or another, are postponed (and, therefore, treated as having been
made on account of an antecedent debt) under the timing rules of section
547(e).
74. The argument that there is such an inconsistency was articulated by Bank-
ruptcy Judge Bayt in a recent decision:
The explicit reference by Congress in Section 547(c) (3) to en-
abling loans lends further support to the conclusion that Section
547(c) (1) is not applicable to the instant transaction. Through its en-
actment of Section 547(c) (3) Congress intended to make that sec-
tion-not Section 547(c) (1)-applicable to an enabling loan situation.
To conclude otherwise would render the provisions of Section
547(c) (3) "redundant and unnecessary."
In re Enlow, 20 Bankr. 480,483 (Bankr. SD. Ind. 1982). See also In re Davis, 22
Bankr. 644, 647-49 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1982); Matter of Vance, 22 Bankr. 26, 28
(Bankr. ED. Tenn. 1982); Matter of Christian, 8 Bankr. 816, 819 (Bankr. M.D.
Fla. 1981). In Enlow, the result of this reasoning was that a purchase money
security interest, acquired on November 1,1980 and perfected 12 days later on
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between section 547(c) (3), which protects purchase money secur-
ity interests that are perfected "before 10 days after" attachment,7 5
and a liberal construction of section 547 (c) (1), which would protect
all security interests created in exchange for new value and per-
fected within a commercially reasonable time thereafter. How-
ever, the several subsections of section 547(c) are intended to be
cumulative,7 6 and there is sufficient room for the coexistence of
both the substantially contemporaneous exchange and the en-
abling loan exceptions in the scheme of preference law in
bankruptcy.77
A limited role for the substantially contemporaneous exchange
exception is also denied by the extensive sweep of section
November 13, 1980, was set aside in bankruptcy as preferential, because it
was not perfected within the 10-day grace periods established by sections
547(e) (2) (A) and 547(c) (3). 20 Bankr. at 481-84. The court's refusal to apply
the substantially contemporaneous exchange exception under these circum-
stances does not serve any principle of sound bankruptcy policy, and, there-
fore, is needlessly Draconian.
75. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c) (3) (Supp. V 1981). See supra note 51 and accompanying
text.
76. The legislative history of section 547(c) makes it clear that the exceptions
apply cumulatively: "Subsection (c) contains exceptions to the trustee's
avoiding power. If a creditor can qualify under any one of the exceptions,
then he is protected to that extent. If he can qualify under several, he is pro-
tected by each to the extent he can qualify under each." HOUSE REPORT,
supra note 7, at 373, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 5963, 6329.
See In re Martella, 22 Bankr. 649, 651-52 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1982).
77. Thus, section 547(c) (3) provides absolute protection to purchase money se-
curity interests perfected within its 10-day grace period without regard to
whether the transaction constitutes "in fact a substantially contemporaneous
exchange." Consider the following example. On January 1, 1982, SP lends D
$100,000 for the purpose of enabling D to purchase an item of business equip-
ment from X. At the closing of the enabling loan, SP and D enter into an
adequate security agreement covering the business equipment. However, D
and X are unable to conclude their negotiations for the purchase of the
equipment until February 10, 1982, when D purchases a specific item of equip-
ment. SP fies a financing statement and perfects its security interest in the
collateral on February 11, 1982. Under section 547(e), the transfer of the se-
curity interest occurs on February 10, 1982, when D first obtained rights in the
collateral and SP's security interest attached and became effective between
the parties. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(e) (2) (A), (e) (3) (Supp. V 1981); U.C.C. § 9-
203(1) (1972); supra notes 17-30 and accompanying text. The transfer of the
security interest is therefore on account of an antecedent debt (the January
1, 1982 enabling loan), and apparently preferential under section 547(b). 11
U.S.C. § 547(b) (Supp. V 1981). See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
Moreover, section 547(c) (1) may not apply, because, at least arguably, the
transaction is not in fact a substantially contemporaneous exchange. How-
ever, section 547(c) (3) should protect this purchase money security interest,
because it was perfected before expiration of the 10-day grace period follow-
ing attachment. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(3)(B) (Supp. V 1981). See A. COHEN,
BANxRUPTcY, SECURED TRANSACTIONS AND OTHER DEBTOR-CREDITOR MAT-
TERS 22-206.43[1], at 501-02 (1981).
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547(c) (1)-the exception protects all "transfers," including trans-
fers of security interests,78 that are intended to be given in ex-
change for "new value," including the extension of "new credit,"79
and that satisfy the requirement of substantial contemporaneity.8 0
Moreover, both equity and commercial reality81 demand applica-
tion of the exception to the delayed perfection problem.
The legitimate contractual expectations of secured creditors
who act to protect their interests within a commercially reasonable
time should not be disregarded in bankruptcy unless some over-
riding purpose is served thereby. No such purpose is furthered by
an inflexible approach to the delayed perfection problem. Security
interests created in exchange for contemporaneous value and per-
fected within a commercially reasonable time offend neither pref-
erence nor secret lien policy in bankruptcy. Such security
interests do not deplete the debtor's estate for the benefit of a par-
ticular creditor; neither do they create an unreasonable risk of mis-
leading other creditors dealing with the debtor. It follows that they
should be recognized and enforced in bankruptcy.
In order to achieve this goal, section 547(c) (1) should be con-
strued to protect security interests transferred during the prefer-
ence period82 to the extent that such security interests are
78. 11 U.S.C-.A § 101(41) (West Supp. 1983).
79. 11 U.S.C. § 547(a) (2) (Supp. V 1981).
80. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c) (1) (Supp. V 1981).
81. For example, the 10-day grace periods of sections 547(c) (3) and 547(e) (2) (A)
appear to be particularly burdensome when applied to security interests in
motor vehicles, trailers, mobile homes, boats, and other collateral covered by
certificate of title legislation. Typically, these security interests are perfected
by notation of the lien on the certificate of title covering the collateral, and
not by the filing of an article 9 financing statement. See U.C.C. § 9-302(3)-(4)
(1972); D. EpsTEnq & J. LANDERS, supra note 10, at 256. A disproportionate
number of the cases decided under the substantially contemporaneous ex-
change exception involve collateral covered by certificates of title. These
cases demonstrate the need for a flexible approach to the delayed perfection
problem, because, in at least some cases, moderate delays in perfection can
occur in the ordinary course of business. See, e.g., In re Burnette, 14 Bankr.
795,803 (E.D. Tenn. 1981) (secured party perfected its purchase money secur-
ity interest 20 days after the sale, when it applied for a certificate of title; the
court noted that "as a practical matter it may take a diligent secured party
twenty days to perfect"); In re Arnett, 13 Bankr. 267 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1981),
afid, 17 Bankr. 912 (E.D. Tenn. 1982) (delay of 33 days was caused by the
holder of a prior security interest who, after being paid off by the secured
party, waited nearly a month before releasing its lien and returning the certif-
icate of title covering the collateral).
82. Under section 547(b) (4), security interests that are not transferred during
the preference period are not preferences and therefore do not require pro-
tection under section 547(c). 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (4) (Supp. V 1981). See supra
note 14 and accompanying text.
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(1) created in exchange for contemporaneous new value, and
(2) perfected within a commercially reasonable time thereafter.
Under this test, the timing rules of section 547(e) will continue
to play an important role in the delayed perfection scenario. Se-
curity interests perfected within the ten-day grace period will, in
general, be entitled to absolute protection against the trustee, be-
cause their transfer will relate back to the date of attachment for
purposes of the antecedent debt, preference period, and insol-
vency requirements of section 547(b).83 Furthermore, section
547(e) will still serve to help the trustee satisfy his or her burden
of establishing a section 547(b) preference when perfection is
delayed beyond expiration of the grace period. Thus, security in-
terests perfected more than ten days after attachment will con-
tinue to date from perfection for purposes of the antecedent debt,
preference period, and insolvency requirements. 84
However, once the trustee has established a section 547(b)
preference, the proposed construction of section 547 (c) (1) will per-
mit the secured creditor to defend its belatedly perfected security
against the trustee's preference attack by demonstrating that the
delay was within the bounds of commercial reasonableness (and
thus, "in fact substantially contemporaneous").85 If the transferee
is unable to make the necessary showing of substantial contempo-
raneity, its belatedly perfected security will be set aside. Thus, the
policy of protecting unsecured creditors against secret liens is
achieved, without interfering with the legitimate contractual ex-
pectations of secured creditors, by limiting the trustee's power to
invalidate belatedly perfected security interests to those cases in
which delays in perfection unreasonably increase the likelihood
that unsecured creditors will be misled.86
83. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (2)-(4), (e) (2) (A), (f) (Supp. V 1981). See supra note 29
and accompanying text.
84. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (2)-(4), (e) (2) (B), (f) (Supp. V 1981). See supra notes 17-30
and accompanying text.
85. There seems to be some confusion as to the locus of the burden of proof
under section 547(c). Some cases hold that section 547(c) creates affirmative
defenses, and that, therefore, the transferee has the burden of pleading and
proving that it "is entitled to the benefit of the exceptions." In re Saco Local
Dev. Corp., 25 Bankr. 876, 878 (Bankr. D. Me. 1982). See In re Ken Gardner
Ford Sales, Inc., 10 Bankr. 632, 646 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1981). However, an-
other recent case holds that the trustee has the burden of establishing every
element of a preference, and that this burden requires the trustee to estab-
lish that the transfer was not protected by section 547(c) (5). In re The Music
House, Inc., 11 Bankr. 139, 140-141 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1980). See also 4 COLLIER
BANKmxr'TcY PRACTICE GuiDE 64.08[1], [2] [e], at 64-46 to 64-47, 64-52 to 64-53
(1981).
86. In fact, it is open to question whether typical types of unsecured creditors,
such as employees and small-scale suppliers, are ever likely to be misled by
even lengthy delays in perfection of security interests, because such credi-
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Defining substantial contemporaneity in terms of commercial
standards softens the rigidity of the ten-day rule by excusing
longer delays that are nevertheless reasonable under the circum-
stances of the particular case. All factors bearing on the reasona-
bleness of the delay should be considered by the courts when
making this determination. Typically, these factors will include:
(1) the length and cause of the delay; (2) the likelihood that other
creditors might have been misled by the delay; and (3) whether
the secured party has acted in good faith and with diligence in at-
tempting to comply with the perfection requirements of applicable
state law.8 7 However, in striving for maximum flexibility, the
bankruptcy courts should not lose sight of the ordinary meaning of
the phrase "substantially contemporaneous"-lengthy delays in
perfection should be tolerated, if at all, only in extreme cases in
which the secured party is able to demonstrate that the delay was
caused by circumstances beyond its control.
I. CONCLUSION
The Bankruptcy Reform Act's treatment of belatedly perfected
security interests in personal property is enigmatic, because it at-
tempts to employ preference law to avoid a class of transfers, so-
called "secret liens," that are not true preferences. When a secur-
ity interest is granted in exchange for contemporaneous value,
preference policy in bankruptcy is not offended, because the trans-
action does not cause a depletion of the debtor's estate for the ben-
efit of a particular creditor. However, the effect the timing rules of
section 547(e) of the New Act is to treat most security interests
perfected during the preference period and more than ten days af-
ter attachment as section 547(b) preferential transfers.
The bankruptcy cases are divided concerning the application of
section 547(c) (1), the substantially contemporaneous exchange
exception, to the delayed perfection problem. One line of cases ap-
plies the exception narrowly and refuses to extend it to security
interests that are not perfected within the ten-day grace period es-
tablished by section 547(e). However, a second line of cases ap-
plies the exception broadly to protect security interests that are
tors generally do not search the public records before dealing with the
debtor. See Viles, The Commercial Code v. The Bankruptcy Act, 55 KY L.J.
636, 670-71 (1967). See also Eisenberg, Bankruptcy Law in Perspective, 28
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 953, 969-71 (1981).
87. See, e.g., In re Martella, 22 Bankr. 649 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1982); In re Burnette,
14 Bankr. 795 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1981); In re Arnett, 13 Bankr. 267 (Bankr.
EM. Tenn. 1981), afd, 17 Bankr. 912 (E.D. Tenn. 1982); Nimmer, supra note
15, at 311.
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(1) created in exchange for contemporaneous new value, and
(2) perfected within a commercially reasonable time thereafter.
This Article concludes that the cases broadly applying the sub-
stantially contemporaneous exchange exception should be fol-
lowed, because the flexible approach adopted in those cases allows
the courts to protect the legitimate contractual expectations of se-
cured creditors who act to perfect their security interests within a
reasonable period of time, without sacrificing the interests of un-
secured creditors who might have been misled by unreasonable
delays in perfection.
